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Summary This paper discusses a set of general network system architectures for industrial process control systems as well as 
vulnerabilities related to these systems and the IT threats these systems are exposed to from the point of view of Common 
Criteria methodology and ITU-T recommendation X.805. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Real-time control systems used in process 
control applications have many characteristics 
different than traditional process information 
systems. Foremost among these is design for 
efficiency and time-critical response. Security is 
generally not a strong design motivation and 
therefore tends to get out of way of performance. 
Computing resources available to perform of 
security functions are often very limited. 
 
2.  PROCESS CONTROL SYSTEMS 
 
Digital industrial control systems can be 
classified into process-based systems or discrete-
based systems. Process-based controls are used to 
control a continuous process such as fuel flow in a 
power plant or petroleum in a refinery. Discrete-
based controls (also known as batch controls) 
control discrete parts manufacturing or “batches” of 
material like in a chemical plant. Both types of 
control utilize the same types of control systems, 
sensors, and networks.  
Figure 1 shows the key control components of 
an industrial control system, including the control 
loop, the human – machine interface (HMI), and 
remote diagnostics and maintenance utilities [1]. A 
control loop consists of sensors, control hardware, 
process actuators, and communication of 
measurement variables. Measurement variables are 
transmitted to the controller from the process 
sensors. The controller interprets the signals and 
generates the corresponding control signals that it 
transmits to the process actuators. Process changes 
result in change of sensor signals, identifying the 
state of the process. 
The human – machine interface allows a control 
engineer or operator to configure set points, control 
algorithms and parameters in the controller. The 
HMI also provides displays of process status 
information, alarms, and other relevant data. 
Diagnostic and maintenance tools, often available 
via modem and Internet interfaces, allow control 
engineers, operators and vendors to monitor and 
modify controller, sensor, and actuator properties 
from remote locations. 
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Fig.1 Main control components 
 
A typical industrial control system contains an 
extension of control loops, HMIs and Remote 
Diagnostics and Maintenance tools built on an array 
of network protocols. Supervisory level loops and 
lower level loops operate continuously over the 
duration of a process at cycle times ranging on the 
order of minutes to milliseconds. 
In a large enterprise, there may be several 
geographically distributed industrial plants. 
Enterprise business operations can access plant 
information over the Internet or in some cases over a 
wide area network (WAN). 
The local area network (LAN) of a processing 
plant services all of the operations within the plant 
while the actual control system of the plant sits on a 
somewhat isolated peer-to-peer network. At this 
level the systems can be categorized into two types 
of supervisory based control schemes, Distributed 
Control Systems (DCS) and Supervisory and Data 
Acquisition Systems (SCADA). DCS are used to 
control large complex processes such as power 
plants, refineries or chemical plants typically at a 
single delimited site. By contrast, SCADA are used 
to control more dispersed assets where centralized 
data acquisition is as important as control. Examples 
of SCADA applications are the water, gas, and 
electrical energy distribution operations. 
The general network architectures of DCS and 
SCADA are shown in Figure 2. By comparison of 
these schemes we can see that at a higher level of 
network architecture, the performed plant operations 
are similar for plants using either DCS or SCADA 
systems. At this level, everything resides on a local 
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area network. Components include general purpose 
workstations, printers, databases, application servers 
and domain controllers. Communication outside the 
plant is typically established via Internet or WAN 
using a firewall. The DCS and local SCADA 
components of a plant typically operate on a peer-to-
peer network.  
A DCS is comprised of a supervisory layer of 
control and one to several distributed controller units 
within the same processing plant. The supervisory 
controller runs on the control server and 
communicates with its subordinate units via a peer-
to-peer network. The supervisor sends set points and 
receives data from distributed controllers. The 
distributed controllers control their associated 
process actuators based on requests from the 
supervisor and process sensors feedback. The 
communication of controller with its sensors and 
actuators is typically realized using a local field bus 
eliminating the need of point-to-point connection 
between the controller and each of these devices. 
There are several types of control units used in 
distributed control points of a DCS. In dependence 
of application the most widespread are machine 
controllers, programmable logic controllers (PLC), 
process controllers and single loop controllers. 
A typical SCADA consists of a Central 
Monitoring System (CMS) and one or more Remote 
Stations (RST). The CMS houses the Control Server 
and the communication routers via a peer-to-peer 
network, collects and logs information gathered 
from by the remote stations and generates necessary 
actions. A remote station consists of either a Remote 
Terminal Unit (RTU) or a PLC which controls 
actuators and monitors sensors. In most cases the 
RST has a capability of diagnostic and repair 
functions interfaced via some type of portable 
computer. The communication channel between 
remote stations and the CMS is realized using 
metallic line, optical line or radio frequency with 
repeaters, where necessary. 
Networked control system architectures which 
include continuous operations of transformation of 
raw materials into usable products, follow the DCS 
scenario. On the other hand, the network 
architectures supporting distribution operations of 
usable products, copy the structure of SCADA. 
3.  VULNERABILITIES AND IT THREATS 
 
As we said before, in the sphere of process 
control, the IT security has been of minimum 
importance. Systems were primarily designed to 
meet performance, reliability, safety, and flexibility 
requirements and were typically physically isolated 
and based on proprietary hardware and 
communication systems. The introduction of 
Internet based information technology within the 
process controls industry has increased 
vulnerabilities to the industry’s computer systems. 
Centralized operation and remote maintenance of 
industry systems performed over public 
telecommunication networks provides potentialities 
for threatening influences of this critical 
infrastructure. DCS and SCADA systems that 
operate on commercial hardware and software, 
combined with connections to external networks, 
allow a simplified invasion and possible devastation 
of these systems. In the survey [2] which has been 
performed on a sample of organizations with 100 
and more employees in different sections of 
industry, business, services, and state administration, 
75% of respondents pointed the occurrence of 
security incidents caused by viruses, 28% caused by 
LAN failure, and 24% due to WAN failure. The 
treats can originate in different sources: despiteful 
invader, terrorist group, disgruntled employer, 
hostile government, but also accident and natural 
disaster. 
Fig.2 Example of DCS and SCADA architectures 
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4.  THE COMMON CRITERIA (CC) 
PROJECT 
 
The goal of the Common Criteria (CC) project 
was to develop a standardized methodology for 
specifying, designing, and evaluating IT products 
that perform security functions which would be 
widely recognized and yield consistent, repeatable 
results independently of technology and 
implementation [3].  
The three-part CC standard ISO/IEC 15408, and 
the CEM are two major components of the CC 
methodology, as shown in Fig. 3. 
 
 
 
Fig.3 Major components of the CC/CEM 
 
Four key concepts are presented in Part 1 of the 
standard: 
1. Protection Profiles (PPs), 
2. Security Targets (STs), 
3. Targets of Evaluation (TOEs), 
4. Packages. 
 
A Protection Profile is an implementation-
independent set of security requirements for a 
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs 
[4]. Security Target denotes a set of security 
requirements and specifications to be used as the 
basis for evaluation of an identified TOE. Target of 
Evaluation is an IT product or system and its 
associated administrator and user guidance 
documentation that is the subject of an evaluation. A 
package is a reusable set of either functional or 
assurance components (e.g. an Evaluation Assurance 
Levels), combined together to satisfy a set of 
identified security objectives. 
5.  ITU-T RECOMMENDATION X.805 
 
The Recommendation defines general security-
related architectural elements that appropriately 
applied can provide end-to-end network security [5].  
The architecture shown in Fig. 4 can be used 
with different network elements, services, and 
applications in order to detect, predict, and correct 
security vulnerabilities.    
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Security architecture for network security 
 
A Security Dimension is a set of security 
measures designed to address a particular aspect of 
the network security. The Recommendation X.805 
identifies eight such sets that protect against all 
major security threats: 1. Access Control, 2. 
Authentication, 3. Non-repudiation, 4. Data 
Confidentiality, 5. Communication Security, 6. Data 
Integrity, 7. Availability, and 8. Privacy.  
In order to offer the flexibility of countering the 
potential threats there are three security layers 
defined: the Infrastructure Layer, the Service Layer, 
and the Application Layer. The security Layers 
identify where security must be addressed in 
elements and systems by providing a sequential 
perspective of network security. 
The Management Security Plane, the Control 
Security Plane, and the End-User Plane are a certain 
type of network activity protected by Security 
Dimensions. Networks should be designed in such a 
way that events occurred on one Security Plane are 
kept totally isolated from the other Security Planes. 
The architecture identifies security issues that 
need to be addressed in order to prevent both 
intentional as well as accidental threats. The 
following threats are described [6]:  
 destruction of information and/or other 
resources, 
 corruption or modification of information, 
 theft, removal or loss of information and/or 
other resources, 
 disclosure of information, 
 interruption of services. 
 
The intersection of each Security Layer with 
each Security Plane represents a security perspective 
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where Security Dimensions are applied to counteract 
the threats. Table 1 shows mapping of Security 
Dimensions to the designated security threats. 
 
Table 1 Mapping Security Dimensions to security 
threats 
 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
Previously we introduced the issue of securing 
distributed industrial process control systems build 
on DCS or SCADA system architecture with WAN 
or Internet connectivity. Such connectivity to public 
accessible networks makes these systems potential 
targets of attacks on their vulnerabilities. 
The objective of ITU-T Recommendation X.805 
is to give developers a comprehensive top-down 
basis for creation of detailed recommendations for 
the end-to-end network security independently of the 
network’s underlying information technology or 
protocol stack. 
The Common Criteria project is applicable as a 
guide for the evaluation of systems with IT security 
functions and IT security measures implemented in 
hardware, firmware, or software. The specific Target 
of Evaluation can be a particular network element 
but also an entire subsystem or network. 
Usage of combination of these frameworks in 
design, implementation and evaluation of distributed 
control systems applied in today’s industry will lead 
to minimization of security threats impacts.  
Further work in field of application and 
development of methodologies for increasing 
security of distributed industrial control systems will 
continue.  
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Access Control      
Authentication      
Non-
Repudiation      
Data 
Confidentiality      
Comm. Security      
Data Integrity      
Availability      
Privacy      
